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 The position regulating close of pleadings in South African law 
of civil procedure has for a long time been unchallenged. 
However, the court in Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Limited 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) developed the common law to allow 
for the transmissibility of claims for general damages to the 
deceased's estate even if pleadings have not reached the stage 
of litis contestatio. The argument is that while the need for the 
development for the common law is recognised, the minority 
opinion should be the preferred approach. The majority held that 
the common law should be developed to allow all claims for 
general damages to be transmissible to the deceased's estate 
even if the stage of litis contestatio has not been reached. This 
note posits that the points raised by the minority opinion are of 
sufficient magnitude to prevent the immediate wholesale 
development of the common law. Detailed legal argument 
specifically addressing the development of the common law as 
a whole in this context, as well as the knock-on effects of the 
same were not ventilated, and as such the majority judgment 
can be viewed as premature. The paper provides an analytical 
and critical view of the judgment. 
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1 Introduction 
Litis contestatio has its roots in Roman law.1 When a Roman citizen wished 
to initiate litigation, he was required to access a magistrate who had the 
power of iurisdictio, and the magistrate would decide if the litigant had a 
case that warranted being taken further for the purpose of trial.2 
The stage of the procedure which took place before the magistrate, and 
terminated when issue was joined (litis contestatio) was known as the 
procedure in iure.3 
The concept of litis contestatio has been likened to the making of a contract 
between parties wherein they would settle the terms according to which 
… they submitted themselves to the decision of the judge in lieu of their 
erstwhile rights.4 Litis contestatio is considered ʹcriticalʹ as it is the moment 
when parties 'joined issue'. 
From this moment onward the plaintiff's right was held to be "consumed" in 
Roman law.5 In modern times litis contestatio is known as "close of 
pleadings".6 Van Zyl observes that one of the fundamental consequences 
of litis contestatio is that the litigant (instituting the action), cannot later bring 
legal proceedings against a defendant based on the same facts and cause 
of action.7 Prior to the Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company8 judgment, 
the position regulating close of pleadings was as follows: “If a plaintiff who 
was claiming for non-pecuniary damages for pain and suffering died before 
litis contestatio, his claim died with him”.9 However, should the plaintiff die 
after litis contestatio, then in such circumstances the claim would be 
transmitted to the plaintiff's estate. Jones and Buckle10 make reference to 
Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk,11 which held that the rules of court that 
govern close of pleadings do “… not merely create a rebuttable presumption 
                                            
* Muhammed Siraaj Khan. LLB, LLM (University of KwaZulu-Natal), Attorney of the 
High Court of South Africa. Lecturer, Faculty of Law, North-West University 
(Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa. E-mail: 30448093@nwu.ac.za. 
1  See for example Thomas Textbook of Roman Law 104. 
2  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 365. 
3  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 365. 
4  Thomas Textbook of Roman Law 104. 
5  Jolowicz Historical Introduction 187. The author explains "consumed" to mean "even 
if judgment was not obtained, no fresh action could be brought on the same claim". 
6  See for example Theophilopoulos et al Fundamental Principles 302. 
7  Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 378. 
8  Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) (hereafter 
Nkala). 
9  Peté et al Civil Procedure 222. 
10  Jones and Buckle Civil Practice of the Magistrates' Courts HCR 29A-1. 
11  Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 (T). 
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that pleadings were closed but in fact constituted a substantive rule of 
adjectival law”. 
The position prior to the Nkala judgment was thus clear: claims for damages 
for personal injury were transmissible on the death of the party only after 
litis contestatio. 
The circumstances when pleadings are deemed closed are clearly outlined 
in the rules of court. Rule 29 of the Uniform Rules of Court12 provide that 
pleadings will be considered closed:  
(a)  if either party has joined issue without alleging any new matter, and 
without adding any further pleading;  
(b)  if the last day allowed for filing a replication or subsequent pleading 
has elapsed and it has not been filed;  
(c)  if the parties agree in writing that the pleadings are closed and such 
agreement is filed with the registrar; or  
(d) if the parties are unable to agree as to the close of pleadings, and the 
court upon the application of a party declares them closed. 
Peté et al point out that Rule 29 of the Uniform Rules of court is "subject to 
the parties' entitlement to amend pleadings in terms of Rule 28".13 They note 
that "minor or immaterial amendments would not result in fresh litis 
contestatio".14 It appears that the wording of Rule 29 (or Magistrates' Court 
Rule 21A) of the Uniform Rules of Court is in conformity with common law 
in that it does not alter the common law consequences of litis contestatio.15 
In Nkala the court had to make a decision with regard to the development 
of the common law position governing the transmissibility of general 
damages, in the event that the plaintiff/applicant passes away prior to the 
matter's reaching the stage of litis contestatio.16 This note explores the 
                                            
12  The Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944 Rule 21A provides a virtually identically 
worded section. 
13  Peté et al Civil Procedure 223, fn 200. 
14  Peté et al Civil Procedure 223, fn 200. 
15  There is potential for the abuse of Rule 28 of the Uniform Rules of Court, which 
would have an impact on litis contestatio, in the sense that a party may constantly 
make amendments to their pleadings, and this would essentially amount to pleadings 
being opened again. See Peté et al Civil Procedure 223, fn 200, where reference is 
made to KS v MS 2016 1 SA 64 (KZN), which held that minor or insignificant changes 
would "not result in fresh litis contestatio". 
16  Nkala para 176. 
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consequences of the Nkala judgment through a consideration of the legal 
and practical issues surrounding close of pleadings and the effect that this 
has had on the common law position, by examining the majority and minority 
opinions in that case. In this note I will take the position that the minority 
judgment should be followed instead of the majority judgment. To make my 
argument I will discuss the facts of the judgment and to this effect I will 
provide a brief summary of the key points. This will be followed by a brief 
overview of the legislation governing close of pleadings, and the 
development of the common law. Finally, the minority and majority 
judgments will be evaluated and I will explain why I believe that the minority 
judgment is better. 
2 Facts 
The Nkala case involved mineworkers seeking compensation from the gold 
mines at which they were employed. The basis of the mineworkers' claim 
was that they contracted Silicosis or Tuberculosis (TB) due to the failure of 
the mining companies to provide adequate measures to prevent this. The 
action involved the miners' dependants' seeking compensation for general 
damages (which were incurred by the applicants, and who subsequently 
passed away during the action) as well. The case dealt with multiple legal 
issues, including class action, the law of delict, costs, litis contestatio, and 
the development of the common law.17 
                                            
17  While it is outside the scope of the intended discussion, it necessary to very briefly 
provide some insight as to what Silicosis and TB are (after all they are central to the 
applicants' case), as well as an overview of what the other legal issues were. 
Silicosis is caused exclusively by the miners' inhaling crystalline silica dust (which is, 
of course, a consequence of working in the mines). Silicosis is an incurable disease. 
TB, on the other hand, is a lung disease which can be treated. The mineworkers 
admitted that TB is not contracted by exposure to the silica dust present at the mines, 
but averred rather the exposure to the dust poses a risk for the development of TB. 
The judgment then turned to look at the issue of class action and the logistics of the 
same. Ultimately the Court concluded that "it is in the interest of justice that the 
matter be dealt with in a single class action hearing" (Nkala para 180). The Court 
made reference to several affidavits from the applicants which portrayed a sad story 
of how the miners had to wake up in the early hours of the morning, how they were 
exposed to constant physical and emotional abuse, and how they were generally 
subjected to cruel treatment at the hands of their managers (para 180). The miners 
further outlined how the masks that they were provided with were insufficient for their 
purpose (that of preventing the dust particles from being inhaled). The mineworkers 
further sought an order from the court declaring that any claim for general damages 
that a mineworker brought or might wish to bring against any of the mining 
companies subject to the litigation was transmissible to his estate, should such a 
miner pass away prior to the proceeding reaching the stage of litis contestatio. 
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The issue of close of pleadings is of significance, because if the miners 
passed away before the close of pleadings, then their claims would die with 
them. This would result in their families receiving no benefit, however, if they 
passed away after pleadings were deemed to be closed, then the claim 
would be transferred to the deceased's estate. 
3 Majority opinion on the transmissibility of general 
damages 
The majority opinion was that claims for general damages should be 
transmissible in all instances, regardless of whether the stage of litis 
contestatio has been reached or not.18 The common law was thus 
developed accordingly. Mojapele DJP and Vally J for the majority 
considered the history of litis contestatio. They noted that in Roman law the 
transmissibility of certain claims to or against heirs of a deceased estate 
were prevented.19 "Claims in rem could be transmitted, while claims in 
personam could not."20 The court further pointed out that a claim for an 
iniuriarum (actio iniuriarum – a claim for relief pursuant to a wrongful and 
intentional damage to personality) was not transmissible to or against the 
heirs. 
An exception to this rule was noted, which is that, regardless of whether the 
claim was in rem or in personam, once litis contestatio had taken place "the 
death of either party in no way prevented the continuation of proceedings 
by or against his heir".21 
The majority pointed out that this Roman Dutch rule (which followed Roman 
Law) had been transposed into South African Law, and that the position had 
remained unchanged since 1880.22 The court correctly went on to say that 
the prevailing conditions in South Africa with regard to social, economic and 
legal factors were vastly different from those that existed in the times of early 
Roman law.23 We now have a supreme Constitution which promotes the 
values of equality and human dignity, and the development of the common 
law should take place in the light of such values.24 
                                            
18  Nkala para 215. 
19  Nkala para 180. 
20  Nkala para 180. 
21  Nkala para 180. 
22  Nkala paras 181-184. 
23  Nkala para 184. 
24  See ss 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution) respectively. 
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The different types of damages that a party may claim for need to be 
explored in order to fully understand the impact of the Nkala judgment. The 
two different types of damages are patrimonial damages and non-
patrimonial damage. Often, non-patrimonial damages are referred to as 
general damages, and they include claims for the loss of amenities of life, 
disfigurement, and pain and suffering.25 Such claims are relatively 
straightforward and do not call for the development of the common law, as 
they will be allowed to be transmitted to the deceased's estate even if 
pleadings have not reached the stage of litis constestatio. Claims in the 
other class are difficult to calculate26 because (it is argued) they are of a 
personal nature and should not be transferrable. The present position 
regulating close of pleadings (in relation to the above-mentioned categories 
of damages) was articulated in detail by the court: 
In other words, the executor can sue for any patrimonial loss the deceased 
suffered before his death as well as the funeral expenses which is a 
patrimonial loss suffered after death, and the dependants can sue for any 
patrimonial loss they themselves will suffer as a result of the premature death 
of their financial provider or breadwinner.27 
The court further noted that “neither can sue for any personal injury such as 
pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life or disfigurement (general 
damages) the deceased suffered prior to his death”.28 The court took note 
of an exception to the rule, to the effect that where the deceased had already 
instituted action and the proceedings had reached the stage of litis 
contestatio before his/her death, and the claim was continued by the 
executor of his/her estate, "the claim for the personal injuries does not 
abate".29 In such circumstance the law allows for the claim for general 
damages to be transmitted to the estate.30 The court observed that 
… the basis for the exception is exactly the same as that under the early 
Roman law, which provides that the rights of the plaintiff were defined and 
'frozen', at the moment the stage of litis contestatio was reached.31 
In such circumstances, the executor merely steps into the position of the 
deceased.32 The issue as to when the stage of litis contestatio is reached in 
the modern law (according to the court) is not so straightforward.33 
                                            
25  Nkala para 185. 
26  Nkala para 186. 
27  Nkala para 188. 
28  Nkala para 188. 
29  Nkala para 188. 
30  Nkala para 188. 
31  Nkala para 188. 
32  Nkala para 188. 
33  Nkala para 188. 
MS KHAN  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  7 
Guidance as to when pleadings are closed can be found in Rule 29 of the 
Uniform Rules of Court (or Magistrates' Court Rule 21A).34 
While the Uniform Rules of Court and the Magistrates' Court Rules are 
relatively straight-forward, there are exceptions. Normally pleadings will be 
deemed closed if the dies allowed for replication elapse without the 
replication being served.35 Even though pleadings are closed, they are 
considered re-opened in the event that a party effects an amendment. It is 
observed by the court that the reason the rule exists (the rule that a claim 
for general damages is not be transmissible to the deceased's estate) is that 
"general damages are personal to the claimant".36 The court held that this 
rule (which is embedded in common law) is outdated. The mineworkers' 
submission was that this rule infringes on the provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
and that the application of the rule had the potential to cause immense 
injustice not only to them but to their heirs as well. 
There was consensus between both the majority and the minority judgments 
that the common law does require development in this regard. However, 
there was no agreement as to what this development should entail exactly. 
The majority judgment held that there was a constitutional imperative to 
develop the common law, because the arguments advanced by the 
mineworkers were quite forceful.37 In essence the mineworkers submitted 
that their right to bodily integrity38 and freedom and security of person39 were 
being violated by the common law in preventing their claims to transmit to 
their estates. 
Another important point that was submitted by the applicants was that the 
common law position infringed section 9 of the Constitution (which provides 
for the equal treatment of all persons) because it arbitrarily differentiated 
between survivor's pre-litis contestatio and post litis contestatio.40 The rights 
of terminally ill miners were being violated in this regard, as many of them 
would probably not survive until the action was finalised. These persons and 
their heirs would be forced to forfeit a sound claim solely because they had 
passed away before litis contestatio.41 It was held that should the claim for 
                                            
34  Nkala para 188. 
35  Uniform Rules of Court 29, Magistrate Court Rule 21A. 
36  Nkala para 191. 
37  Nkala para 200. 
38  Section 12(2) of the Constitution. 
39  Section 12(1) of the Constitution. 
40  Nkala para 204. 
41  Nkala para 204. 
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general damages not be allowed to be transmitted to the miners' estates 
(just because such miners passed away prior to the close of pleadings) in 
these circumstances, it would amount to substantial injustice.42 The system 
of close of pleadings could potentially be abused. A party (such as the 
mining companies, in this instance) could amend their pleadings at any time, 
and this would result in pleadings being re-opened, the consequence of 
which might mean the heirs' losing their claims on this technicality.43 In this 
light, the majority held that: “… if the law is not developed, then in this case 
it would have failed the weak individuals and benefitted the powerful 
corporates”.44 Ultimately it was held that the common law has to be 
developed such that claims for general damages are transmissible to the 
estate or executor of a deceased mineworker despite the fact that the 
litigation has not reached a stage when pleadings are deemed to be closed 
at the time of the death of the deceased.45 
The majority judgment took the matter a step further when it held that the 
development of the common law should not be limited to instances where 
the plaintiff has passed away prior to litis contestatio, but that it should be 
applied in instances where a defendant or potential defendant had passed 
away prior to litis contestatio, as the principles that applied to the plaintiff 
should apply mutatis mutandis to the defendant as well.46 
4 Minority opinion on transmissibility of general damages 
Windell J dissented from the majority judgment on the issue of the 
transmissibility of general damages prior to litis contestatio.47 The judge 
pointed out that the relief sought by the miners was for members of the class 
action only, and that “transmissibility of general damages in all actions 
generally was neither dealt with nor is it relevant for the purposes of deciding 
this case”.48 Windell J further correctly made reference to the fact that the 
court was not privy to proper arguments in this respect, and that a judgment 
declaring that general damages are always transmissible to the deceased's 
estate could have "far reaching consequence".49 The minority judgment 
held that the common law should be developed in relation to class action 
                                            
42  Nkala para 213. 
43  Nkala para 213. 
44  Nkala para 213. 
45  Nkala para 215. 
46  Nkala para 216. 
47  Nkala para 231. 
48  Nkala para 234. 
49  Nkala para 234. 
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proceedings only.50 Windell J was in favour of an incremental development 
of the common law.51 It was held that the "knock-on effect" must be taken 
into consideration: a declaration that general damages will always be 
transmissible to a deceased's estate even prior to litis contestatio was of 
considerable gravity, as it affected other branches of law.52 Particular 
reference was made to Road Accident Fund matters. The learned Judge 
suggested that due to the volume of claims for general damages being 
transmitted to the deceased's estate, the viability of the Road Accident Fund 
would be placed risk if the law were developed as per the majority 
judgment.53 This was an example of further information being required to 
fully understand the consequences of developing the common law. 
5 An evaluation of the Nkala judgment 
Ultimately the question is whether the common law has been developed 
correctly. The two judgments identified the need for the common law to be 
developed, but they adopted slightly different stances with regard to the 
issue. 
Section 39 of the Constitution provides: 
(1)  When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b)  must consider international law; and 
(c)  may consider foreign law. 
(2)  When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
In line with the above constitutional provision,  there has always been “ a 
need for the law to develop to respond to contemporary development”.54 
However, it appears that there are no clear-cut guidelines with regard to the 
framework for developing the common law in certain cases.55 Davis submits 
                                            
50  Nkala para 241. 
51  Nkala para 243. 
52  Nkala para 234. 
53  Nkala para 234. 
54  Davis 2014 Stell LR 3. 
55  Davis 2014 Stell LR 10. The cases referred to in the article are: Lee v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2013 2 SA 144 (CC), and Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle 
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that an “… examination of the normative framework of the Constitution as 
divined from the spirit, purports and objectives of the Bill of Rights …is 
required”.56  
In discussing this principle in the context of the Lee case, Davis states that 
the finding would have made it clear that a development of the common-law 
rule which is used to ascertain factual causation was needed.57 Likewise 
such a need (of course in relation to claims for general damages instead of 
factual causation) was identified in the Nkala case. The question that then 
arises is which judgment (if any) is preferred? 
Windell J was cautious in restricting the development of the common law 
with regard to the transmissibility of general damages prior to litis 
contestatio to class action only, based on the following grounds: that proper 
argument in favour of the development of the common law in general had 
not been made, and secondly that such a judgment would have an effect on 
other branches of law (specific reference was made to succession and Road 
Accident Fund matters).58 Research with regard to the exact figures that 
would need to be paid out by the Road Accident Fund in the light of the 
development declared by the majority judgment needs to be performed. 
The counter argument would involve asking a question: even if the figures 
turned out to be drastic, would this be sufficient reason to continue the 
injustice that the majority judgment had identified? If the general damages 
due (to the now deceased class member) were to be denied simply because 
he succumbed to his disease prior to the stage of litis contestatio, this would 
perpetuate the injustice.59 
The way forward could possibly involve a section 36 (limitations clause) 
inquiry, weighing up (for example) the right to freedom of security and bodily 
integrity, and equality against the rights of victims of motor vehicle collisions 
to claim compensation for injuries. It is my opinion that the minority judgment 
should be the preferred method of developing the common law until such 
time that a better researched argument is presented to the Courts for the 
development of the common law to allow for the transmissibility of general 
                                            
Properties (Pty) Limited 2012 3 SA 531 (CC). (Section 39 of the Constitution does 
provide for the development of the common law.) 
56  Davis 2014 Stell LR 12. 
57  Davis 2014 Stell LR 12. 
58  Nkala para 234. 
59  Nkala para 213. 
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damages in all instances where litigation has started but litis contestatio has 
not been reached. 
It is recognised that time was of importance in the Nkala case, and the Court 
was under pressure to resolve the issue. However, it is submitted that the 
research required could have been presented in a short period of time. The 
suggestion here is that the matter should have been postponed for a short 
period to allow Counsel to advance argument for and against the 
development of the common law in all instances. In the absence of this 
information, the decision of the majority judgment could be viewed as a 
relatively hasty decision. The minority judgment would have provided the 
necessary relief for the mineworkers without threatening the financial 
sustainability of the Road Accident Fund, and would have opened the door 
for the further development of the common law (if necessary) in future, after 
proper argument had been advanced addressing the issue. 
6 Conclusion 
It is clear that the common law position relating to the transmissibility of 
general damages pre the Nkala judgment required development. The 
majority judgment was adamant that the law must be developed in all such 
instances to allow for the transmissibility of a claim (provided legal 
proceedings have commenced). The minority judgment was of the view that 
the law should be developed to allow the transmissibility of claims for 
general damages prior to litis contestatio, but that this should be restricted 
to class actions. The minority judgment raises pertinent points against the 
majority finding, and it is submitted that these should (and probably will) be 
addressed when the matter is eventually heard on appeal. As it stands, even 
if pleadings are not closed, claims for general damages will be transmissible 
to a deceased's estate. 
To answer the question raised by the title of this note, the close of pleadings 
is not completely irrelevant once litigation has commenced. It still impacts 
on the logistics of proceedings, such as applying for a trial date.60 However, 
in terms of the transmissibility of claims for general damages to the 
deceased's estate, according to the majority opinion in the Nkala judgment, 
it seems that the close of pleadings is irrelevant for that purpose if litigation 
has already commenced. 
                                            
60  See Magistrates' Court Rule 22(1), which provides that the plaintiff is to deliver a 
notice of set-down within 15 court days after the close of pleadings. 
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